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ABSTRACT
Federated learning provides a promising paradigm for collecting machine learning models from
distributed data sources without compromising users’ data privacy. The success of a credible federated
learning system builds on the assumption that the decentralized and self-interested users will be
willing to participate to contribute their local models in a trustworthy way. However, without proper
incentives, users might simply opt out the contribution cycle, or will be mis-incentivized to contribute
spam/false information. This paper introduces solutions to incentivize truthful reporting of a local,
user-side machine learning model for federated learning. Our results build on the literature of
information elicitation, but focus on the questions of eliciting hypothesis (rather than eliciting human
predictions). We provide a scoring rule based framework that incentivizes truthful reporting of local
hypotheses at a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We study the market implementation, accuracy as well
as robustness properties of our proposed solution too. We verify the effectiveness of our methods
using MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. Particularly we show that by reporting low-quality hypotheses,
users will receive decreasing scores (rewards, or payments).
Keywords Federated learning · Hypothesis Elicitation · Peer prediction
1 Introduction
When a company relies on distributed users’ data to train a machine learning model, federated learning [37, 54, 25]
promotes the idea that users/customers’ data should be kept local, and only the locally held/learned hypothesis will be
shared/contributed from each user. While federated learning has observed success in keyboard recognition [21] and in
language modeling [8], existing works have made an implicit assumption that participating users will be willing to
contribute their local hypotheses to help the central entity to refine the model. Nonetheless, without proper incentives,
agents can choose to opt out of the participation, to contribute either uninformative or outdated information, or to even
contribute malicious model information. Though being an important question for federated learning [54, 34, 55, 56],
this capability of providing adequate incentives for user participation has largely been overlooked. In this paper we
ask the questions that: Can a machine learning hypothesis be incentivized/elicited by a certain form of scoring rules
from self-interested agents? The availability of a scoring rule will help us design a payment for the elicited hypothesis
properly to motivate the reporting of high-quality ones. The corresponding solutions complement the literature of
federated learning by offering a generic template for incentivizing users’ participation.
We address the challenge via providing a scoring framework to elicit hypotheses truthfully from the self-interested
agents/users1. More concretely, suppose an agent i has a locally observed hypothesis f∗i . For instance, the hypothesis
can come from solving a local problem: f∗i = argminfi∼Hi E(X,Y )∼D[`i (fi(X), Y )] according to a certain hypothesis
classHi, a distributionD, a loss function `i. The goal is to design a scoring function S(·) that takes a reported hypothesis
fi, and possibly a second input argument (to be defined in the context) such that E [S(f∗i , ·)] ≥ E [S(fi, ·)] ,∀fi, where
the expectation is w.r.t. agent i’s local belief, which is specified in context. If the above can be achieved, S(·) can serve
as the basis of a payment system in federated learning such that agents paid by S(·) will be incentivized to contribute
their local models truthfully. In this work, we primarily consider two settings, with arguably increasing difficulties in
designing our mechanisms:
1Throughout this paper, we will interchange the use of agents and users.
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With ground truth verification (X,Y ) We will start with a relatively easier setting where we as the designer has
access to a labeled dataset {(xn, yn)}Nn=1. We will demonstrate how this question is similar to the classical information
elicitation problem with strictly proper scoring rule [16], calibrated loss functions [2] and peer prediction (information
elicitation without verification) [38].
With only access to features X The second setting is when we only have X but not the ground truth Y . This case
is arguably more popular in practice, since collecting label annotation requires a substantial amount of efforts. For
instance, a company is interested in eliciting/training a classifier for an image classification problem. While it has access
to images, it might not have spent efforts in collecting labels for the images. We will again present a peer prediciton-ish
solution for this setting.
Besides establishing the desired incentive properties of the scoring rules, we will look into questions such as when the
scoring mechanism is rewarding accurate classifiers, how to build a prediction market-ish solution to elicit improving
classifiers, as well as our mechanism’s robustness against possible collusion. Our work can be viewed both as a
contribution to federated learning via providing incentives for selfish agents to share their hypotheses, as well as a
contribution to the literature of information elicitation via studying the problem of hypothesis elicitation. We validate
our claims via experiments using the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
All omitted proofs and experiment details can be found in the supplementary materials.
1.1 Related works
Due to space limit, we only briefly survey the related two lines of works:
Information elicitation Our solution concept relates most closely to the literature of information elicitation [5, 50,
46, 36, 24, 17]. Information elicitation primarily focuses on the questions of developing scoring rule to incentivize or to
elicite self-interested agents’ private probalistic beliefs about a private event (e.g., how likely will COVID-19 death
toll reach 100K by May 1?). Relevant to us, [1] provides a market treatment to elicit more accurate classifiers but the
solution requires the designer to have the ground truth labels and agents to agree on the losses. We provide a more
generic solution without above limiations.
A more challenging setting features an elicitation question while there sans ground truth verification. Peer prediction
[42, 39, 51, 43, 52, 12, 48, 44, 31, 27, 33] is among the most popular solution concept. The core idea of peer prediction
is to score each agent based on another reference report elicited from the rest of agents, and to leverage on the stochastic
correlation between different agents’ information. Most relevant to us is the Correlated Agreement mechanism
[12, 48, 27]. We provide a separate discussion of it in Section 2.1.
Federated learning Federated learning [37, 21, 54] arose recently as a promising architecture for learning from
massive amounts of users’ local information without polling their private data. The existing literature has devoted
extensive efforts to make the model sharing process more secure [7, 40, 45, 23, 18, 4], more efficient [35, 10, 15, 11,
26, 19, 49], more robust [29, 9, 53, 41] to heterogeneity in the distributed data source, among many other works. For
more detailed survey please refer to several thorough ones [54, 25].
The incentive issue has been listed as an outstanding problem in federated learning [54]. There have been several very
recent works touching on the challenge of incentive design in federated learning. [34] proposed a currency system for
federated learning based on blockchain techniques. [55] describes a payoff sharing algorithm that maximizes system
designer’s utility, but the solution does not consider the agents’ strategic behaviors induced by insufficient incentives.
[56] further added fairness guarantees to an above reward system. We are not aware of a systematic study of the
truthfulness in incentiving hypotheses in federated learning, and our work complements above results by providing an
incentive-compatible scoring system for building a payment system for federated learning.
2 Formulation
Consider the setting with a set K = {1, 2, ...,K} of agents, each with a hypothesis f∗i ∈ Hi which maps feature
space X to label space Y ∈ {1, 2, ..., L} := [L]. The hypothesis spaceHi is the space of hypotheses accessible or yet
considered by agent i, perhaps as a function of the subsets of X or Y which have been encountered by i or the agent’s
available computational power. f∗i is often obtained following a local optimization process. For example, f
∗
i can be
defined as the function which minimizes a loss function over an agent’s hypothesis space.
f∗i = argmin
fi∼Hi
EDi
[
1
(
fi(X) 6= Y
) ]
2
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where in above Di is the local distribution that agent i has access to train and evaluate f∗i . In the federated learning
setting, note that f∗i can also represent the optimal output from a private training algorithm and Hi would denote a
training hypothesis space that encodes a certainly level of privacy guarantees. In this paper, we do not discuss the specific
ways to make a local hypothesis private 2, but rather we focus on developing scoring functions to incentivize/elicit this
“private" and ready-to-be shared hypothesis.
Suppose the mechanism designer has access to a dataset D: D can be a standard training set with pairs of features
and labels D := {(xn, yn)}Nn=1, or we are in a unsupervised setting where we don’t have labels associated with each
sample xi: D := {xn}Nn=1.
The goal of the mechanism designer is to collect f∗i truthfully from agent i. Denote the reported/contributed hypothesis
from agent i as fi3. Each agent will be scored using a function S that takes all reported hypotheses fj ,∀j and D as
inputs: S
(
fi, {fj 6=i}, D
)
such that it is “proper” at a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium:
Definition 1. S(·) is called inducing truthful reporting at a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if for every agent i, assuming
for all j 6= i, fj = f∗j (i.e., every other agent is willing to report their hypotheses truthfully),
E
[
S
(
f∗i , {f∗j 6=i}, D
)]
≥ E
[
S
(
fi, {f∗j 6=i}, D
)]
, ∀fi,
where the expectation encodes agent i’s belief about {f∗j 6=i} and D.
2.1 Peer prediction
Peer prediction is a technique developed to truthfully elicit information when there is no ground truth verification.
Suppose we are interested in eliciting private observations about a categorical event y ∈ [L] generated according to a
random variable Y (in the context of a machine learning task, Y can be thought of as labels). Each of the K ≥ 2 agents
holds a noisy observation of y, denoted as yi ∈ [L], i ∈ [K]. Again the goal of the mechanism designer is to elicit the
yis, but they are private and we do not have access to the ground truth Y to perform an evaluation. The scoring function
S is designed so that truth-telling is a strict Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (implying other agents truthfully report their
yj), that is, ∀i, Eyj [S (yi, yj) |yi] > Eyj [S (ri, yj) |yi] , ∀ri 6= yi.
Correlated Agreement Correlated Agreement (CA) [12, 47] is a recently established peer prediction mechanism for
a multi-task setting. CA is also the core and the focus of our subsequent sections. This mechanism builds on a ∆ matrix
that captures the stochastic correlation between the two sources of predictions yi and yj . ∆ ∈ RL×L is then defined as
a squared matrix with its entries defined as follows:
∆(k, l) = P
(
yi = k, yj = l
)− P(yi = k)P(yj = l), k, l ∈ [L].
The intuition of above ∆ matrix is that each (i, j) entry of ∆ captures the marginal correlation between the two
predictions. Sgn(∆) denotes the sign matrix of ∆: where Sgn(x) = 1, x > 0; Sgn(x) = 0, o.w.
CA requires each agent i to perform multiple tasks: denote agent i’s observations for the N tasks as yi,1, ..., yi,N .
Ultimately the scoring function S(·) for each task k that is shared between i, j is defined as follows: randomly draw
two other tasks k1, k2 , k1 6= k2 6= k,
S
(
yi,k, yj,k
)
:=Sgn
(
∆(yi,k, yj,k)
)− Sgn(∆(yi,k1 , yj,k2)),
It was established in [47] that CA is truthful and proper (Theorem 5.2, [47]) 4. P(yj = y′|yi = y) < P(yj = y′),∀i, j ∈
[K], y′ 6= y then S(·) is strictly truthful (Theorem 4.4, [47]).
3 Elicitation with verification
We start by considering the setting where the mechanism designer has access to ground truth labels, i.e., D =
{(xn, yn)}Nn=1.
2There exists a variety of definitions of privacy and their corresponding solutions for achieving so. Notable solutions include
output perturbation [6] or output sampling [3] to preserve privacy when differential privacy [14] is adopted to quantify the preserved
privacy level.
3fi can be none if users chose to not contribute.
4To be precise, it is an informed truthfulness. We refer interested readers to [47] for the detailed differences.
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3.1 A warm-up case: eliciting Bayes optimal classifier
As a warm-up, we start with the question of eliciting the Bayes optimal classifier:
f∗i = argmin
fi
E(X,Y )
[
1
(
fi(X) 6= Y
)]
.
It is straightforward to observe that, by definition using −1(·) (negative sign changes a loss to a reward (score)) and any
affine transformation of it a1(·) + b, a < 0 will be sufficient to incentivize truthful reporting of hypothesis. Next we are
going to show that any classification-calibrated loss function [2] can serve as a proper scoring function for eliciting
hypothesis.5
Theorem 1. Any classification calibrated loss function `(·) (paying agents −`(fi(X), Y )) induces truthful reporting
of the Bayes optimal classifier.
3.2 Eliciting “any-optimal" classifier: a peer prediction approach
Now consider the case that an agent does not hold an absolute Bayes optimal classifier. Instead, in practice, agent’s
local hypothesis will depend on the local observations they have, the privacy level he desired, the hypothesis space and
training method he is using. Consider agent i holds the following hypothesis f∗i , according to a loss function `i, and a
hypothesis spaceHi: f∗i = argminfi∼Hi E
[
`i
(
fi(X), Y
)]
.
By definition, each specific `i will be sufficient to incentivize a hypothesis. However, it is unclear how f∗i trained using
`i would necessarily be optimal according to a universal metric/score. We aim for a more generic approach to elicit
different f∗i s that are returned from different training procedure and hypothesis classes. In the following sections, we
provide a peer prediction approach to do so.
We first state the hypothesis elicitation problem as a standard peer prediction problem. The connection is made by
firstly rephrasing the two data sources, the classifiers and the labels, from agents’ perspective. Let’s re-interpret the
ground truth label Y as an “optimal" agent who holds a hypothesis f∗(X) = Y . We denote this agent as A∗. Each
local hypothesis f∗i agent i holds can be interpreted as the agent that observes f
∗
i (x1), ..., f
∗
i (xN ) for a set of randomly
drawn feature vectors x1, ..., xN : f∗i (xn) ∼ Ai(X). Then a peer prediction mechanism induces truthful reporting if:
E [S(f∗i (X), f∗(X))] ≥ E [S(f(X), f∗(X))] , ∀f.
Correlated Agreement for hypothesis elicitation To be more concrete, consider a specific implementation of peer
prediction mechanism, the Correlated Agreement (CA). Recall that the mechanism builds on a correlation matrix
∆(f∗i (X), f
∗(X)) defined as follows:
∆∗(k, l) = P
(
f∗i (X) = k, f
∗(X) = l
)− P(f∗i (X) = k)P(f∗(X) = l), k, l ∈ [L].
Then the CA for hypothesis elicitation is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 CA for Hypothesis Elicitation
1: For each sample xn, randomly sample two other tasks xp1 6= xp2 6= xn to pair with.
2: Pay a reported hypothesis f(·) for xn according to
S(f(xn), f
∗(xn)) := Sgn (∆∗(f(xn), f∗(xn)))− Sgn (∆∗(f(xp1), f∗(xp2))) (1)
3: Total payment to a reported hypothesis f : S(f, f∗) :=
∑N
n=1 S(f(xn), f
∗(xn)).
We reproduce the incentive guarantees and required conditions:
Theorem 2. CA mechanism induces truthful reporting of a hypothesis at a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Knowledge requirement of ∆∗ We’d like to note that knowing the sign of ∆∗ matrix between f∗i and f∗ is a
relatively weak assumption to have to run the mechanism. For example, for a binary classification task L = 2, define
the following accuracy measure,
FNR(f) := P(f(X) = 2|Y = 1), FPR(f) := P(f(X) = 1|Y = 2).
We offer the following:
5We provide details of the calibration in the proof. Classical examples include cross-entropy loss, squared loss, etc.
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Lemma 1. For binary classification (L = 2), if FNR(f∗i ) + FPR(f∗i ) < 1, Sgn(∆∗) is an identify matrix.
FNR(f∗i ) + FPR(f
∗
i ) < 1 is stating that f
∗
i is informative about the ground truth label Y [31]. Similar conditions
can be derived for L > 2 to guarantee an identify Sgn(∆∗). With identifying a simple structure of Sgn(∆∗), the CA
mechanism for hypothesis elicitation runs in a rather simple manner.
When do we reward accuracy The elegance of the above CA mechanism leverages the correlation between a
classifier and the ground truth label. Ideally we’d like a mechanism that rewards the accuracy of the contributed
classifier. Consider the binary label case:
Theorem 3. When P(Y = 1) = 0.5 (uniform prior), and let Sgn(∆∗ = I2×2) be the identity matrix, the more accurate
classifier within eachHi receives a higher score.
Note that the above result does not conflict with our incentive claims. In an equal prior case, misreporting can only
reduce a believed optimal classifier’s accuracy instead of the other way. It remains an interesting question to understand
a more generic set of conditions under which CA will be able to incentivize contributions of more accurate classifiers.
A market implementation The above scoring mechanism leads to a market implementation [20] that incentivizes
improving classifiers. In particular, suppose agents come and participate at discrete time step t. Denote the hypothesis
agent contributed at time step t as f∗t (and his report ft). Agent at time t will be paid according to S(ft(X), Y ) −
S(ft−1(X), Y ), where S(·) is an incentive-compatible scoring function that elicits ft truthfully using Y . The incentive-
compatibility of the market payment is immediate due to S(·). The above market implementation incentivizes improving
classifiers with bounded budget 6.
Calibrated CA scores When ∆∗ is the identity matrix, the CA mechanism reduces to:
S(f(xn), f
∗(xn)) := 1 (f(xn) = f∗(xn))− 1 (f(xp1) = f∗(xp2))
That is the reward structure of CA builds on 0-1 loss function. We ask the question of can we extend the CA to a
calibrated one? We define the following loss-calibrated scoring function for CA:
Calibrated CA: S`(f(xn), f∗(xn)) = −`(f(xn), f∗(xn)))− (−`(f(xp1), f∗(xp2))).
Here again we negate the loss ` to make it a reward (agent will seek to maximize it instead of minimizing it). If this
extension is possible, not only we will be able to include more scoring functions, but also we are allowed to score/verify
non-binary classifiers directly. Due to space limit, we provide positive answers and detailed results in Appendix, while
we will present empirical results on the calibrated scores of CA in Section 5.
4 Elicitation without verification
Now we move on to a more challenging setting where we do not have ground truth label Y to verify the accuracy,
or the informativeness of f(X), i.e., the mechanism designer only has access to a D = {xn}Nn=1. The main idea of
our solution from this section follows straight-forwardly from the previous section, but instead of having a ground
truth agent f∗, for each classifier f∗i we only have a reference agent f
∗
j drawn from the rest agents j 6= i to score with.
The corresponding scoring rule takes the form of S(fi(X), fj(X)), and similarly the goal is to achieve the following:
E
[
S(f∗i (X), f
∗
j (X))
] ≥ E [S(f(X), f∗j (X))] , ∀f.
As argued before, if we treat fi and fj as two agents Ai and Aj holding private information, a properly defined
peer prediction scoring function that elicits Ai using Aj will suffice to elicit fi using fj . Again we will focus
on using Correlated Agreement as a running example. Recall that the mechanism builds on a correlation matrix
∆∗(f∗i (X), f
∗
j (X)).
∆∗(k, l) = P
(
f∗i (X) = k, f
∗
j (X) = l
)− P(f∗i (X) = k)P(f∗j (X) = l), k, l ∈ [L]
The mechanism then operates as follows: For each task xn, randomly sample two other tasks xp1 , xp2 . Then pay a
reported hypothesis according to
S(fi, fj) :=
N∑
n=1
Sgn (∆∗(fi(xn), fj(xn)))− Sgn (∆∗(fi(xp1), fj(xp2))) (2)
We reproduce the incentive guarantees:
6Telescoping returns:
∑T
t=1 (S(ft(X), Y )− S(ft−1(X), Y )) = S(fT (X), Y )− S(f0(X), Y ).
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Theorem 4. CA mechanism induces truthful reporting of a hypothesis at a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 so we will not repeat the details in the Appendix.
To enable a clean presentation of analysis, the rest of this section will focus on using/applying CA for the binary case
L = 2. First, as an extension to Lemma 1, we have:
Lemma 2. If f∗i and f∗j are conditionally independent given Y , FNR(f∗i )+FPR(f∗i ) < 1 and FNR(f∗j )+FPR(f∗j ) <
1, then Sgn(∆∗) is an identify matrix.
When do we reward accuracy As mentioned earlier that in general peer prediction mechanisms do not incentivize
accuracy. Nonetheless we provide conditions under which they do. The result below holds for binary classifications.
Theorem 5. When (i) P(Y = 1) = 0.5, (ii) Sgn(∆∗) = I2×2, and (iii) f∗i (X) and f∗j (X) are conditional independent
of Y , the more accurate classifier within eachHi receives a higher score in expectation.
4.1 Peer Prediction market
Implementing the above peer prediction setting in a market setting is hard, due to again the challenge of no ground truth
verification. The use of reference answers collected from other peers to similarly close a market will create incentives
for further manipulations.
Our first attempt is to crowdsource to obtain an independent survey answer and use the survey answer to close the
market. Denote the survey hypothesis as f ′ and use f ′ to close the market:
S(ft(x), f
′(x))− S(ft−1(X), f ′(x)) (3)
Theorem 6. When the survey hypothesis f ′(x) is (i) conditionally independent from the market contributions, and (ii)
Bayesian informative, then closing the market using the crowdsourcing survey hypothesis is incentive compatible.
The above mechanism is manipulable in several aspects. Particularly, the crowdsourcing process needs to be independent
from the market, which implies that the survey participant will need to stay away from participating in the market -
but it is unclear whether this will be the case. In the Appendix we show that by maintaining a survey process that
elicits C > 1 hypotheses, we can further improve the robustness of our mechanisms against agents performing a joint
manipulation on both surveys and markets.
Remark Before we conclude this section, we remark that the above solution for the without verification setting also
points to an hybrid solution when the designer has access to both sample points with and without ground truth labels.
The introduction of the pure peer assessment solution helps reduce the variance of payment.
4.2 Robust elicitation
Running a peer prediction mechanism with verifications coming only from peer agents is vulnerable when facing
collusion. In this section we answer the question of how robust our mechanisms are when facing a γ-fraction of
adversary in the participating population. To instantiate our discussion, consider the following setting
• There are 1 − γ fraction of agents who will act truthfully if incentivized properly. Denote the randomly drawn
classifier from this 1− γ population as f∗1−γ .
• There are γ fraction of agents are adversary, whose reported hypotheses can be arbitrary and are purely adversarial.
Denote the following quantifies α := P(f∗1−γ(X) = 2|Y = 1), β := P(f∗1−γ(X) = 1|Y = 2) α∗ := P(f∗(X) =
2|Y = 1), β∗ := P(f∗(X) = 1|Y = 2), that is α, β are the error rates for the eliciting classifier f∗1−γ while α∗, β∗ are
the error rates for the Bayes optimal classifier. We prove the following
Theorem 7. CA is truthful in eliciting hypothesis when facing γ-fraction of adversary when γ satisfies: 1−γγ >
1−α∗−β∗
1−α−β .
When the agent believes that the classifier the 1− γ crowd holds is as accurate as the Bayes optimal classifier we have
1−α∗−β∗
1−α−β =
1−α∗−β∗
1−α∗−β∗ = 1, then a sufficient condition for eliciting truthful reporting is γ < 50%, that is our mechanism
is robust up to half of the population manipulating. Clearly the more accurate the reference classifier is, the more robust
our mechanism is.
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Figure 1: Hypothesis scores versus misreport rate on MNIST dataset.
5 Experiments
In this section, we implement two reward structures of CA: 0-1 score and Cross-Entropy (CE) score as mentioned
at the end of Section 3.2. We experiment on two image classification tasks: MNIST [30] and CIFAR-10 [28] in
our experiments. For agent AW (weak agent), we choose LeNet [30] and ResNet34 [22] for MNIST and CIFAR-10
respectively. For AS (strong agent), we use a 13-layer CNN architecture for both datasets.
Either of them is trained on random sampled 25000 images from each image classification training task. After the
training process, agent AW reaches 99.37% and 62.46% test accuracy if he truthfully reports the prediction on MNIST
and CIFAR-10 test data. Agent AS is able to reach 99.74% and 76.89% test accuracy if the prediction on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 test data is truthfully reported.
AW and AS receive hypothesis scores based on the test data Xtest (10000 test images) of MNIST or CIFAR-10. For
elicitation with verification, we use ground truth labels to calculate the hypothesis score. For elicitation without
verification, we replace the ground truth labels with the other agent’s prediction - AW will serve as AS’s peer reference
hypothesis and vice versa.
5.1 Results
Statistically, an agent i’s mis-reported hypothesis can be expressed by a misreport transition matrix T . Each element
Tj,k represents the probability of flipping the truthfully reported label f∗i (x) = j to the misreported label f˜i(x) = k:
Tj,k = P(f˜i(X) = k|f∗i (X) = j). Random flipping predictions will degrade the quality of a classifier. When there
is no adversary attack, we focus on two kinds of misreport transition matrix: a uniform matrix or a sparse matrix.
For the uniform matrix, we assume the probability of flipping from a given class into other classes to be the same:
Ti,j = Ti,k = e, ∀i 6= j 6= k. e changes gradually from 0 to 0.56 after 10 increases, which results in a 0%–50%
misreport rate. The sparse matrix focuses on particular 5 pairs of classes which are easily mistaken between each
pair. Denote the corresponding transition matrix elements of class pair (i, j) to be: (Tij , Tji), i 6= j, we assume that
Tij = Tji = e,∀(i, j). e changes gradually from 0 to 0.5 after 10 increases, which results in a 0%–50% misreport rate.
Every setting is simulated 5 times. The line in each figure consists of the median score of 5 runs as well as the
corresponding “deviation interval", which is the maximum absolute score deviation. The y axis symbolizes the averaged
score of all test images.
As shown in Figure 1, 2, in most situations, 0-1 score and CE score of both AW and AS keep on decreasing while
the misreport rate is increasing. As for 0-1 score without ground truth verification, the score of either agent begins to
fluctuate more when the misreport rate in sparse misreport model is > 35%. Our results conclude that both the 0-1
score and CE score induce truthful reporting of a hypothesis and will penalize misreported agents whether there is
ground truth for verification or not.
5.2 Elicitation with adversarial attack
We test the robustness of our mechanism when facing a 0.3-fraction of adversary in the participating population. We
introduce an adversarial agent, LinfPGDAttack, introduced in AdverTorch [13] to influence the labels for verification
when there is no ground truth. In Figure 3, both the 0-1 score and CE score induce truthful reporting of a hypothesis for
MNIST.
However, for CIFAR-10, with the increasing of misreport rate, the decreasing tendency fluctuates more often. Two
factors attribute to this phenomenon: the agents’ abilities as well as the quality of generated "ground truth" labels.
When the misreport rate is large and generated labels are of low quality, the probability of successfully matching the
7
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Figure 2: Hypothesis scores versus misreport rate on CIFAR-10 dataset.
misreported label to an incorrect generated label can be much higher than usual. But in general, these two scoring
structures incentivize agents to truthfully report their results.
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Figure 3: Hypothesis scores versus misreport rate (with adversarial attack).
6 Concluding remarks
This paper provides an elicitation framework to incentivize contribution of truthful hypotheses in federated learning.
We have offered a scoring rule based solution template which we name as hypothesis elicitation. We establish the
incentive property of the proposed scoring mechanisms and have tested their performance with real-world datasets
extensively. We have also looked into the accuracy, robustness of the scoring rules, as well as market approaches for
implementing them.
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Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof for Theorem 1
Definition 2. [2] A classification-calibrated loss function ` is defined as the follows: there exists a non-decreasing
convex function Ψ(·) that satisfies: Ψ (R(f)−R∗) ≤ R`(f)−R∗` . Φ(0) = 0.
Proof. Denote the Bayes risk of a classifier f as R(f) := E(X,Y )
[
1
(
f(X) 6= Y
)]
, its minimum risk as R∗ =
argminf R(f). The classifier’s `-risk is defined as R`(f) := E(X,Y ) [`(f(X), Y )], with its minimum value R∗` :=
argminf R`(f).
We prove by contradiction. Suppose that reporting a hypothesis f returns higher payoff (or a smaller risk) than reporting
f∗i under `. Then
0 > R`(f)−R`(f∗i ) =︸︷︷︸
(1)
R`(f)−R∗` ≥︸︷︷︸
(2)
Ψ (R(f)−R∗) ≥︸︷︷︸
(3)
Ψ(0) = 0,
which is a contradiction. In above, the first equality (1) is by definition, (2) is due to the calibration condition, (3) is due
to the definition of R∗.
Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. The proof builds essentially on the law of total probability (note f∗ and Y are the same):
∆∗(1, 1) = P(f∗i (X) = 1, Y = 1)− P(f∗i (X) = 1) · P(Y = 1)
=P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 1) · P(Y = 1)− P(f∗i (X) = 1) · P(Y = 1)
=P(Y = 1) (P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 1)− P(f∗i (X) = 1))
=P(Y = 1)
(
P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 1)− P(Y = 1)P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 1)
− P(Y = 2)P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 2)
)
=P(Y = 1)
(
P(Y = 2) · P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 1)− P(Y = 2)P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 2)
)
=P(Y = 1) · P(Y = 2) · (P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 1)− P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 2))
=P(Y = 1) · P(Y = 2) · (1− FNR(f∗i )− FPR(f∗i )) > 0
Now consider ∆∗(1, 2):
∆∗(1, 2) = P(f∗i (X) = 1, Y = 2)− P(f∗i (X) = 1) · P(Y = 2)
=P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 2) · P(Y = 2)− P(f∗i (X) = 1) · P(Y = 2)
=P(Y = 2)
(
P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 2)− P(f∗i (X) = 1)
)
=P(Y = 2)
(
P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 2)− P(Y = 1)P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 1)
− P(Y = 2)P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 2)
)
=P(Y = 2)
(
P(Y = 1) · P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 2)− P(Y = 1)P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 1)
)
=P(Y = 2) · P(Y = 1) · (P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 2)− P(f∗i (X) = 1|Y = 1))
=P(Y = 2) · P(Y = 2) · (FNR(f∗i ) + FPR(f∗i )− 1) < 0
The second row of ∆∗ involving ∆∗(2, 1),∆∗(2, 2) can be symmetrically argued.
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Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. Note the following fact:
E[S(f, f∗)] :=
∑
n
E[S(f(xn), f∗(xn))].
Therefore we can focus on the expected score of individual sample X . The incentive compatibility will then hold for
the sum.
The below proof is a rework of the one presented in [48]:
E [S(fi(X), f∗(X))]
= E [Sgn(∆∗(fi(X), f∗(X)))− Sgn(∆∗(fi(Xp1), f∗(Xp2)))]
=
∑
k∈[L]
∑
l∈[L]
P(f∗i (X) = k, f∗(X) = l)
·
∑
r∈[L]
P(fi(X) = r|f∗i (X) = k) · Sgn(∆∗(r, l))
−
∑
k∈[L]
∑
l∈[L]
P(f∗i (Xp1) = k) · P(f∗(Xp2) = l)
·
∑
r∈[L]
P(fi(X) = r|f∗i (Xp1) = k) · Sgn(∆∗(r, l))
=
∑
k∈[L]
∑
l∈[L]
P(fi(X) = k, f∗(X) = l)
·
∑
r∈[L]
P(fi(X) = r|f∗i (X) = k) · Sgn(∆∗(r, l))
−
∑
k∈[L]
∑
l∈[L]
P(f∗i (X) = k) · P(f∗(X) = l) (replacing Xp with X due to iid assumption)
·
∑
r∈[L]
P(fi(X) = r|f∗i (X) = k) · Sgn(∆∗(r, l))
=
∑
k∈[L]
∑
l∈[L]
∆∗(k, l) ·
∑
r∈[L]
P(fi(X) = r|f∗i (X) = k) · Sgn(∆∗(r, l))
Note that truthful reporting returns the following expected payment:∑
k∈[L]
∑
l∈[L]
∆∗(k, l) ·
∑
r∈[L]
P(fi(X) = f∗i (X) = r|f∗i (X) = k) · Sgn(∆∗(r, l))
=
∑
k∈[L]
∑
l∈[L]
∆∗(k, l) · Sgn(∆∗(k, l)) (Only the corresponding k survives the 3rd summation)
=
∑
k,l:∆∗(k,l)>0
∆∗(k, l)
Because
∑
r∈[L] P(fi(X) = r|f∗i (X) = k) · Sgn(∆∗(r, l)) ∈ [0, 1] we conclude that for any other reporting strategy:∑
k,l:∆∗(k,l)>0
∆∗(k, l) ≥
∑
k∈[L]
∑
l∈[L]
∆∗(k, l) ·
∑
r∈[L]
P(fi(X) = r|f∗i (X) = k) · Sgn(∆∗(r, l))
completing the proof.
Proof for Theorem 3
Proof. For any classifier f , the expected score is
E[S(f(X), Y )]
= P(f(X) = Y )− P(f(X) = 1)P(Y = 1)− P(f(X) = 2)P(Y = 2) (independence between xp1 and xp2)
= P(f(X) = Y )− P(f(X) = 1) · 0.5− P(f(X) = 2) · 0.5 (equal prior)
= P(f(X) = Y )− 0.5.
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The last equality indicates that higher than accuracy, the higher the expected score given to the agent, completing the
proof.
Calibrated CA Scores
We start with extending the definition for calibration for CA:
Definition 3. We call S` w.r.t. original CA scoring function S if the following condition holds:
Ψ (E[S(f(X), f∗(X))]− E[S(f∗i (X), f∗(X))])
≤ E[S`(f(X), f∗(X))]− E[S`(f∗i (X), f∗(X))],∀f. (4)
Since S induces f∗i as the maximizer, if S` satisfies the calibration property as defined in Definition 2, we will establish
similarly the incentive property of S(·)
Theorem 8. If for a certain loss function ` such that S` satisfies the calibration condition, then S` induces truthful
reporting of f∗i .
The proof of the above theorem repeats the one for Theorem 1, therefore we omit the details.
Denote by f∗` = argminf R`(f). Sufficient condition for CA calibration was studied in [32]:
Theorem 9 (Theorem 6 of [32]). Under the following conditions, S` is calibrated if P(Y = 1) = 0.5, and f∗` satisfies
the following: E[`(f∗` (X),−Y )] ≥ E[`(f(X),−Y )], ∀f.
Proof for Lemma 2
Proof. Denote by
∆(k, l) = P
(
f∗i (X) = k, f
∗(X) = l
)− P(f∗i (X) = k)P(f∗(X) = l), k, l ∈ {1, 2}.
i.e., the correlation matrix defined between f∗i and ground truth label Y (f
∗). And
∆∗(k, l) = P
(
f∗i (X) = k, f
∗
j (X) = l
)− P(f∗i (X) = k)P(f∗j (X) = l)
∆∗ further dervies
∆∗(k, l) = P
(
f∗i (X) = k, f
∗
j (X) = l
)− P(f∗i (X) = k)P(f∗j (X) = l)
= P
(
f∗i (X) = k, f
∗
j (X) = l|Y = 1
) · P(Y = 1)
+ P
(
f∗i (X) = k, f
∗
j (X) = l|Y = 2
) · P(Y = 2)
− P(f∗i (X) = k) (P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 1) · P(Y = 1) + P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 2) · P(Y = 2))
= P(f∗i (X) = k|Y = 1) · P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 1) · P(Y = 1)
+ P(f∗i (X) = k|Y = 1) · P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 2) · P(Y = 2) (by conditional independence)
− P(f∗i (X) = k) (P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 1) · P(Y = 1) + P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 2) · P(Y = 2))
= P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 1)
(
P(f∗i (X) = k|Y = 1) · P(Y = 1)− P
(
f∗i (X) = k
) · P(Y = 1))
+ P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 2)
(
P(f∗i (X) = k|Y = 2) · P(Y = 2)− P
(
f∗i (X) = k
) · P(Y = 2))
= P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 1) ·∆(k, 1) + P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 2) ·∆(k, 2)
=
(
P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 1)− P(f∗j (X) = l|Y = 2)
) ·∆(k, 1) because (∆(k, 1) + ∆(k, 2) = 0)
If k = 1, l = 1, the above becomes (
1− FNR(f∗j )− FPR(f∗j )
)
∆(1, 1) > 0
If k = 1, l = 2, the above becomes (−1 + FNR(f∗j ) + FPR(f∗j ))∆(1, 1) < 0
If k = 2, l = 1, the above becomes (
1− FNR(f∗j )− FPR(f∗j )
)
∆(2, 1) < 0
If k = 2, l = 2, the above becomes (−1 + FNR(f∗j ) + FPR(f∗j ))∆(2, 1) > 0
Proved.
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Proof for Theorem 5
Proof. Shorthand the following error rates:
α′ = P(f ′(X) = 2|Y = 1), β′ = P(f ′(X) = 1|Y = 2)
When two classifiers f, f ′ are conditionally independent given Y , next we establish the following fact:
E[S(f(X), f ′(X))] = (1− α′ − β′) · E[S(f(X), Y )]. (5)
Short-hand p := P(Y = 1). Then
E[S(f(X), f ′(X))]
=E[1(f(X), f ′(X))]
− P(f(X) = 1)P(f ′(X) = 1)− P(f(X) = 2)P(f ′(X) = 2) (second term in CA)
=p · E[1(f(X), f ′(X))|Y = 1] + (1− p) · E[1(f(X), f ′(X))|Y = 2]
− P(f(X) = 1)P(f ′(X) = 1)− P(f(X) = 2)P(f ′(X) = 2)
=p · E[1(f(X), 1)] · (1− α′) + p · E[1(f(X), 2)] · α′ (by conditional independence)
+ (1− p) · E[1(f(X), 1)] · β′ + (1− p) · E[1(f(X), 2)] · (1− β′) (by conditional independence)
− P(f(X) = 1)P(f ′(X) = 1)− P(f(X) = 2)P(f ′(X) = 2)
=p · (1− α′ − β′) · E[1(f(X), 1)] + (1− p) · (1− α′ − β′) · E[1(f(X), 2)]
+ α′ · E[1(f(X), 2)] + β′ · E[1(f(X), 1)]
− P(f(X) = 1)P(f ′(X) = 1)− P(f(X) = 2)P(f ′(X) = 2)
=(1− α′ − β′) · E[1(f(X), Y )]
− P(f(X) = 1)(P(f ′(X) = 1)− β′)
− P(f(X) = 2)(P(f ′(X) = 2)− α′) (∗)
Since
P(f ′(X) = 1) = P(Y = 1) · P(f ′(X) = 1|Y = 1) + P(Y = 2) · P(f ′(X) = 1|Y = 2)
= p · (1− α′) + (1− p) · β′
we have
P(f ′(X) = 1)− β′ = p · (1− α′ − β′)
Similarly we have
P(f ′(X) = 2)− α′ = (1− p) · (1− α′ − β′)
Then
(∗) =(1− α′ − β′) · E[1(f(X), Y )]− (1− α′ − β′) · (P(f(X) = 1) · p+ P(f(X) = 2) · (1− p))
=(1− α′ − β′) · (E[1(f(X), Y )]− (P(f(X) = 1) · p+ P(f(X) = 2) · (1− p)))
=(1− α′ − β′) · E[S(f(X), Y )]. (definition of CA on f(X) and Y )
By condition (iii), replace f, f ′ above with f∗i , f
∗
j we know
E[S(f∗i (X), f∗j (X))] = (1− αj − βj)E[S(f∗i (X), Y )]
where
αj = P(f∗j (X) = 2|Y = 1), βj = P(f∗j (X) = 1|Y = 2)
When condition (ii) considering an identify ∆∗ we know that f∗j is Bayesian informative, which states exactly that [31]
1− αj − βj > 0
Definition 4 (Bayesian informativeness [31]). A classifier f is Bayesian informative w.r.t. Y if
1− P(f(X) = 2|Y = 1)− P(f(X) = 1|Y = 2) > 0.
Further we have proven that E[S(f(X), Y )] rewards accuracy under Condition (i):
E[S(f∗i (X), Y )] = P(f∗i (X) = Y )− P(f∗i (X) = 1)P(Y = 1)− P(f∗i (X) = 2)P(Y = 2)
= P(f∗i (X) = Y )− P(f∗i (X) = 1) · 0.5− P(f∗i (X) = 2) · 0.5
= P(f∗i (X) = Y )− 0.5,
completing the proof.
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Proof for Theorem 6
Proof. The proof uses the fact that E[S(f(X), f ′(X))] = (1− α′ − β′) · E[S(f(X), Y )] proved in Theorem 5, Eqn.
(5):
E[S(ft(x), f ′(x))− S(ft−1(X), f ′(x))] = (1− α′ − β′)(E[S(ft(x), Y )− S(ft−1(X), Y )])
Since f ′ is Bayesian informative we know that 1 − α′ − β′ > 0 (Definition 4). Using the incentive-compatibility
property of S when the market is closed with ground truth Y (note that S(ft−1(X), Y ) is independent from reporting
ft) we complete the proof.
Peer Prediction Markets
Our idea of making a robust extension is to pair the market with a separate “survey" elicitation process that elicits
redundant C hypotheses:
Algorithm 2 Market for Hypothesis Elicitation
1: Pay crowdsourcing survey participants using surveys and the CA mechanism;
2: Randomly draw a hypothesis from the surveys (from the C collected ones) to close the market according to Eqn.
(3), up to a scaling factor λ > 0.
Assuming the survey hypotheses are conditional independent w.r.t. the ground truth Y . Denote by f ′ a randomly drawn
hypothesis from the surveys, and
α′ := P(f ′(X) = 2|Y = 1), β′ := P(f ′(X) = 1|Y = 2)
For an agent who participated both in survey and market will receive the following:
S(fi, f
′
−i) + λ(S(ft, f
′)− S(ft−1, f ′))
Below we establish its incentive property:
Theorem 10. For any δ that δ := λ(1−α′−β′)·(C+λ(C−1)) −→︸︷︷︸
C→∞
0, agents have incentives to report a hypothesis that is
at most δ less accurate than the truthful one.
Proof. The agent can choose to participate in either the crowdsourcing survey or the prediction market, or both. For
agents who participated only in the survey, there is clearly no incentive to deviate. This is guaranteed by the incentive
property of a proper peer prediction mechanism (in our case it is the CA mechanism that we use to guarantee the
incentive property.).
For agents who only participated in the market at time t, we have its expected score as follows:
E[S(ft(X), f ′(X))]− E[S(ft−1(X), f ′(X))]
=(1− α′ − β′) · E[S(ft(X), Y )]− (1− α′ − β′) · E[S(ft−1(X), Y )]
=(1− α′ − β′)(E[S(ft(X), Y )]− E[S(ft−1(X), Y )]),
where in above we have used Theorem 6, Eqn. (5). We then have proved the incentive compatibility for this scenario.
Now consider an agent who participated both on the survey and market. Suppose the index of this particular agent is i
in the survey pool and t in the market.
By truthfully reporting f∗i , f
∗
t the agent is scored as
E[S(f∗i (X), f∗−i(X))] + λ(E[S(f∗t (X), f ′(X))]− E[S(f∗t−1(X), f ′(X))])
=E[S(f∗i (X), f∗−i(X))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term I
+λ · C − 1
C
(
E[S(f∗t (X), f∗−i)]− E[S(f∗t−1(X), f∗−i)]
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term II: 1− 1/C probability of seeing another survey
+ λ · 1
C
· (E[S(f∗t (X), f∗t (X))]− E[S(f∗t−1(X), f∗t (X))])︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term III: 1/C probability of seeing their own survey hypothesis for closing the market.
(6)
We analyze each of the above terms:
16
A PREPRINT
Term I Due to the incentive-compatibility of CA, the first term E[S(f∗i (X), f∗−i(X))] is maximized by truthful
reporting. And the decrease in score with deviation is proportional to 7
E[S(f(X), f∗−i)] = λ · (1− α′ − β′) · E[S(f(X), Y )]
Term II The second term C−1C (·) is also maximized by truthful reporting, because it is proportional to E[S(f∗t (X), Y )]
(application of Eqn. (5))
λ · C − 1
C
· E[S(f∗t (X), f∗−i)] = λ ·
C − 1
C
· (1− α′ − β′) · E[S(f∗t (X), Y )]
Term III The third 1/C(·) term is profitable via deviation. Suppose agent deviates to reporting some f that differs
from f∗i by δ amount in accuracy:
δ := E[1(f(X), Y )− 1(f∗i (X), Y )]
that is f is δ less accurate than f∗i . Under CA, since E[S(f(X), Y )] = P(f(X) = Y )− 0.5 (from the proof for
Theorem 3),
E[S(f(X), f(X))]− E[S(f∗t−1(X), f(X))]
=E[1(f(X), f(X))− 1(f∗t−1(X), f(X))]
=1− E[1(f∗t−1(X), f(X))]
We have
0 ≤ λ · 1
C
· (E[S(f(X), f(X))]− E[S(f∗t−1(X), f(X))]) ≤ λC
Therefore the possible gain from the third term is bounded by λC .
On the other hand, again since E[S(f(X), Y )] = P(f(X) = Y ) − 0.5 (from the proof for Theorem 3), the loss via
deviation (the first two terms in Eqn. (6)) is lower bounded by(
1 + λ · C − 1
C
)
· (1− α′ − β′) · E[S(f(X), Y )− S(f∗i (X), Y )]
=
(
1 + λ · C − 1
C
)
· (1− α′ − β′) · E[1(f(X), Y )− 1(f∗i (X), Y )]
=
(
1 + λ · C − 1
C
)
· (1− α′ − β′) · δ,
where 1 comes from the survey reward. Therefore when C is sufficiently large such that(
1 + λ · C − 1
C
)
· (1− α′ − β′) · δ ≥ λ
C
i.e.,
δ ≥ λ
(1− α′ − β′) · (C + λ(C − 1))
Agent has no incentive to report such a f .
Proof for Theorem 7
Proof. Denote by f˜(X) the reference classifier randomly drawn from the population. Then the expected score for
reporting a hypothesis f is given by:
E[S(f(X), f˜(X))] = (1− γ) · E[S(f(X), f∗1−γ(X))] + γ · E[S(f(X), f∗γ (X))]
= (1− γ) · (1− α− β) · E[S(f(X), Y )]
+ γ · (1− αˆ− βˆ) · E[S(f(X), Y )]
7Here we make a simplification that when the population of survey is large enough, f−i (average classifier by removing one
agent) is roughly having the same error rates as f ′.
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where αˆ, βˆ are the error rates of the adversarial classifier f∗γ :
αˆ := P(f∗γ (X) = 2|Y = 1), βˆ := P(f∗γ (X) = 1|Y = 2).
The second equality is due to the application of Theorem 6, Eqn. (5) on f∗1−γ(X) and f
∗
γ (X).
Therefore
E[S(f(X), f˜(X))] =
(
(1− γ) · (1− α− β) + γ · (1− αˆ− βˆ)
)
· E[S(f(X), Y )]
Due to the incentive property of E[S(f(X), Y )], a sufficient and necessary condition to remain truthful is
(1− γ) · (1− α− β) + γ · (1− αˆ− βˆ) > 0
Now we prove
1− αˆ− βˆ ≥ −(1− α∗ − β∗)
This is because the most adversarial classifier cannot be worse than reversing the Bayesian optimal classifier - otherwise
if the error rate is higher than reversing the Bayes optimal classifier (with error rates 1− α∗, 1− β∗):
αˆ > 1− α∗, βˆ > 1− β∗
we can reverse the adversarial classifier to obtain a classifier that performs better than the Bayes optimal one:
1− αˆ < α∗, 1− βˆ < β∗
which is a contradiction! Therefore
αˆ ≤ 1− α∗, βˆ ≤ 1− β∗ ⇒ 1− αˆ− βˆ ≥ −(1− α∗ − β∗)
Therefore a sufficient condition is given by
1− γ
γ
>
1− α∗ − β∗
1− α− β
B. Experiment details
Training hyper-parameters
We did not tune hyper-parameters for the training process, since we focus on hypothesis elicitation rather than improving
the agent’s ability/performance. We concentrate on different misreport transition matrices as well as the misreport
rate which falls in the range of [0.0, 0.5] during the hypothesis elicitation stage. In the original submitted version,
the mentioned machine learning architecture for agent AS and AW is a typo. The architecture that we use in our
experiments are specified below.
• MNIST
Agent AW is trained on uniformly sampled 25000 training images from MNIST training dataset. The
architecture is LeNet. Agent AS is trained on uniformly sampled 25000 training images (with a different
random seed) from MNIST training dataset. The architecture is a 13-layer CNN architecture. Both agents are
trained for 100 epochs. The optimizer is SGD with momentum 0.9 and weight decay 1e-4. The initial learning
rate is 0.1 and times 0.1 every 20 epochs.
• CIFAR-10
Agent AW is trained on uniformly sampled 25000 training images from CIFAR-10 training dataset. The
architecture is ResNet34. Agent AS is trained on uniformly sampled 25000 training images (with a different
random seed) from CIFAR-10 training dataset. The architecture is a 13-layer CNN architecture. Both agents
are trained for 180 epochs. The optimizer is SGD with momentum 0.9 and weight decay 1e-4. The initial
learning rate is 0.1 and times 0.1 every 40 epochs.
• Adversarial attack
We use LinfPGDAttack, introduced in AdverTorch [13] to simulate the adversary untargeted attacks. We adopt
an example parameter setting provided by AdverTorch: cross-entropy loss function, eps is 0.15, number of
iteration is 40, maximum clip is 1.0 and minimum clip is 0.0.
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Misreport models
• Uniform misreport model
In certain real world scenarios, an agent refuses to truthfully report the prediction by randomly selecting
another different class as the prediction. We use the uniform misreport transition matrix to simulate this case.
In our experiments, we assume that the probability of flipping from a given class into other classes to be the
same: Ti,j = Ti,k = e, ∀i 6= j 6= k. Mathematically, the misreport transition matrix can be expressed as:
1− 9e e e e e e e e e e
e 1− 9e e e e e e e e e
e e 1− 9e e e e e e e e
e e e 1− 9e e e e e e e
e e e e 1− 9e e e e e e
e e e e e 1− 9e e e e e
e e e e e e 1− 9e e e e
e e e e e e e 1− 9e e e
e e e e e e e e 1− 9e e
e e e e e e e e e 1− 9e

We choose the value of 9e to be: [0.0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.45, 0.50] for all men-
tioned experiments in Section 5.
• Sparse misreport model
For low resolution images or similar images, an agent is only able to make ambiguous decision. The agent
may doubt whether his prediction could result in a higher score than choosing the other similar category or not.
Thus, he may purposely report the other one which is not the original prediction. Even if an expert agent is
able to distinguish confusing classes, it may still choose not to truthfully report the prediction since many other
agents can not classify the image successfully. Without ground truth for verification, reporting truthfully and
giving the correct prediction may result in a lower score than misreporting. For the sparse misreport transition
matrix, we assume Ti,j = Tj,i = e, ∀(i, j), i 6= j. Mathematically, the misreport transition matrix can be
expressed as: 
1− e 0 e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1− e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e
e 0 1− e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1− e 0 e 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1− e 0 0 e 0 0
0 0 0 e 0 1− e 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1− e 0 e 0
0 0 0 0 e 0 0 1− e 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 e 0 1− e 0
0 e 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1− e

We choose the value of e to be: [0.0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.45, 0.50] for all mentioned
experiments in Section 5.
Evaluation
In the training stage, we use categorical cross-entropy as our loss function for evaluation. In the hypothesis elicitation
stage, we choose two kinds of reward structure in the CA mechanism: 0-1 score and CE score. Let f∗ denote the
“optimal" agent, fi denote the agent waiting to be scored. Mathematically, 0-1 score (one-hot encode the model output
probability list) can be expressed as:
S(fi(xn), f
∗(xn)) := 1 (fi(xn) = f∗(xn))− 1 (fi(xp1) = f∗(xp2))
CE score can be expressed as:
S`CE (fi(xn), f
∗(xn)) = −`CE(fi(xn), f∗(xn)))− (−`CE(fi(xp1), f∗(xp2))).
• Ground truth for verification
When there are ground truth labels for verification, f∗(x) is equal to the corresponding ground truth label for a
test image x.
• No ground truth for verification
When there aren’t ground truth labels for verification, we substitute the other agent’s prediction for the ground
truth label. Thus, f∗(x) := f∗j (x), j 6= i for a test image x.
• Adversarial attacks and no ground truth verification
To simulate the case when facing a 0.3-fraction of adversary in the participating population and without ground
truth for verification, we use LinfPGDAttack to influence the labels for verification. Specifically, given a test
image x, LinfPGDAttack will attack x and generate a noisy image xattack, we replace the ground truth labels
with weighted agents’ prediction. Mathematically, f∗(x) := 0.7 · f∗j (x) + 0.3 · f∗j (xattack), j 6= i for the test
image x. The weighting procedure is implemented before one-hot encoding stage for f∗j (x) and f
∗
j (xattack).
After that, the one-hot encoded label is considered as the ground truth label for verification.
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Statistics and central tendency
• Misreport rate
The statistics “misreport rate" in Figure 1,2 symbolizes the proportion of misreported labels. For example, in a
uniform transition matrix, Ti,j = Ti,k = e, ∀i 6= j 6= k, the misreport rate is 9e. While in a sparse transition
matrix setting, given Ti,j = Tj,i = e, ∀(i, j), i 6= j, the misreport rate is exactly e.
To see how adversarial attacks will affect the elicitation, in Figure 3, we choose the same misreport transition
matrices used in Figure 1,2 and calculate the misreport rate before applying the adversarial attacks.
• Central tendency
We run 5 times for each experiment setting as shown in Figure 1,2,3. The central line is the mean of 5 runs.
The “deviation interval" (error bars) is the maximum absolute score deviation. For example, suppose in the
elicitation with ground truth verification setting, we have 5 runs/scores for a uniform transition matrix with a
0.25 misreport rate: [0.5, 0.5, 0.2, 0.1, 0.7], the mean is 0.4, the corresponding absolution score deviation is:
[0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.3]. Then the “deviation interval" comes to: 0.4± 0.3. Since the number of runs is not a
large number, absolute deviation is no less than the standard deviation in our experiment setting.
Computing infrastructure
In our experiments, we use a GPU cluster (8 TITAN V GPUs and 16 GeForce GTX 1080 GPUs) for training and
evaluation.
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